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use of linear contracts, as in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), we consider a variant of its gen-
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agents are incorporated. In this model, we prove that there exists a linear and stationary
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1 Introduction
We analyze contracting between a principal and a team of agents, where the outcome process
is governed by a Brownian motion. Agents have CARA utilities and jointly determine the drift
and diffusion rates. Each of them can observe the others’ behavior and exploit any collusion and
renegotiation opportunities at every instant via enforceable side–contracts contingent on effort levels
and realized outcomes. We establish a theoretical justification for the use of linear contracts by
proving that there are optimal stationary and linear sharing rules that are immune to collusion and
renegotiation.1 Thus, it is as if the agents were to choose the mean and variance only once and the
principal were restricted to employ stationary and linear sharing rules.
Agents’ ability to observe and verify others’ actions and their knowledge of how each one of them
affects the mean and variance as well as how these contribute to their costs bring about collusion
and renegotiation concerns.2 These, in turn, imply that agents’ agreements have to be efficient.
Alternatively, they have to solve a utilitarian bargaining in every date and state. The principal
who cannot observe or verify agents’ behavior only knows that the agents’ bargaining (induced
by her own offer) must result in an efficient outcome. Hence, the optimal contract she offers (i.e.
individually rational sharing rules and control laws, drift and diffusion rates) must solve in every
date and state agents’ bargaining problem for some bargaining weights. Efficiency with CARA
preferences delivers a useful aggregation result which we employ to establish that the principal
can contract with the team as if she is contracting with a representative agent having CARA
preferences, because we prove the following: Given optimal control laws for the drift and diffusion
rates and an optimal compensation for the team, agents’ compensations obtained from the efficient
distribution of team’s compensations employing the stationary bargaining weights that are stated
1Contacts generally have simpler forms (such as linear) compared to the ones predicted by the theory. As far as
empirical evidence is concerned, Lafontaine (1992) reports that “franchise contracts generally involve the payment,
from the franchisee to the franchisor, of a lump–sum franchise fee as well as a proportion of sales in royalties, with
the latter usually constant over all sales levels.” And, Slade (1996) notes that only linear contracts are used by the
oil companies engaged in franchising in retail–gasoline markets in Vancouver.
2This formulation is plausible when agents are better informed than the principal about the managerial details
and interim outcomes of the project. This can occur when the principal does not have the necessary technical training
(e.g., lacking the expertise to operate a nuclear power plant) to deal with the associated details which agents (well
trained in nuclear physics and details about how to operate that power plant) are supposed to be fluent with in
the first place. Or, when she is far away (e.g., in another country) from the agents (working in an overseas factory
producing a technical product) and information technologies are not sufficient (possibly due to language barriers) so
that the principal has to base her contract only on the final output, while agents working together (and speaking the
same language) can observe and verify others’ choices.
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in our main result and the very same control laws, also solve agents’ bargaining problem with their
“real” date and state specific bargaining weights starting every date and state. Therefore, the fact
that these particular bargaining weights are not necessarily agents’ real bargaining weights (that
the principal is not necessarily aware of) turns out not to be important. Due to the fact that, now,
the principal is contracting with a representative agent having CARA preferences, her problem can
be analyzed using techniques in Sung (1995) which enable us to establish that there is an optimal
and stationary linear contract for the team. As linearity is preserved during the corresponding
efficient redistribution of team’s compensation to agents, our main result is established.3
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), the pioneer work displaying the optimality of linear contracts
in a repeated agency setting with exponential utilities, considers a principal–agent pair where the
agent determines the drift rate of a Brownian motion.4 Scha¨ttler and Sung (1993) extends this
setting by considering a larger class of stochastic processes. The key restriction in both models is
that the agent is not allowed to control the variance of the outcome process. Sung (1995) extends
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987)’s Brownian model to the case where the agent can also control the
diffusion rate of the Brownian motion. The resulting problem becomes similar to that in Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1987) with an additional time–state independent constraint for which the linearity in
outcome result holds. Koo, Shim, and Sung (2008), on the other hand, presents a continuous–time
agency model under moral hazard with many agents.5 They show that optimal contracts are also
linear in all outcomes produced separately by each agent. For their linearity result, the formulation
involving the simultaneous–move game played by agents is important to preserve stationary decision
making environment. Meanwhile, our model does not feature separate production processes and
our agents can perfectly observe each other and can engage in renegotiable side–contracting.
The paper is organized as follows. While section 2 contains the model and the principal’s
problem, section 3 presents the main result and its proof and section 4 concludes.
3We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out that our analysis can be associated with bonus pools in invest-
ment banks. Bonus pools are allocated to divisions based on their performances. A division manager, who is given
much flexibility, allocates the bonus to the employees. While some criticize nonuniform bonus allocations among
employees on basis of fairness, our paper provides a justification: the bonus of an employee is determined through a
utilitarian bargaining within the division, hence, depends on his relative bargaining power and risk preferences. The
assumptions needed in this setting are: the employees cannot communicate with the shareholders; and the division
manager knows the bargaining weights and risk aversion parameters of the employees, but the shareholders do not.
4Lack of income effects with exponential utilities and time–state independent cost functions, imply that the
optimal control the agent chooses is time–state independent. Stationarity of the environment implies that among all
possible compensation schemes, an optimal one is stationary and linear in the final output.
5Their model is a continuous–time counterpart of Holmstrom (1982) and an extension of Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1987) with N agents. The principal has N production tasks one for each agent who cannot observe each other.
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2 Model and Preliminaries
The principal and N agents interact over time interval t ∈ [0, 1]. At an instant t, agent i ∈ N ≡
{1, . . . , N} chooses an effort level eit ∈ Ei, Ei a compact interval, and these choices are observable
and verifiable by all the other agents, but not the principal. The probability space is given by
(Ω,F , P ) where Ω is the space C = C([0, 1]) of all continuous functions on the interval [0, 1] with
values in <. So a particular event w ∈ Ω is of the form w : [0, 1] → <. The effort choices
e : [0, 1] → ×i∈NEi, where et = (eit)i∈N , imply control laws µ and σ which are assumed to be Ft–
predictable mappings, µ : [0, 1]×Ω→ U and σ : [0, 1]×Ω→ S, where U is a bounded open subset
of < and S is a compact subset of <++. Controls µ and σ determine the instantaneous drift, µt,
and the diffusion rates, σt, of a stochastic process, {Xt}t, governed by a Brownian motion defined
by dXt = µtdt+ σtdBt. Indeed, µt ≡ µ(t,X) and σt ≡ σ(t,X).6
The intermediate outcome Xt should be thought of as the total returns up to period t ∈ [0, 1],
and Bt is the standard Wiener process. The drift and diffusion rates and intermediate accumulated
returns are neither observable nor verifiable by the principal. However, X1, the level of accumulated
returns at the end of the project, is observable and verifiable by the principal. At the beginning of
the project, the principal and the agents agree upon a contract, i.e. salary rules S = (Si)i∈N with
Si : Ω→ < for all i ∈ N and control laws (µ, σ) with the restriction that salaries are payable at the
end of the project according to the rules agreed upon at time 0 which depend only on X1.
7
Instantaneous time–state independent cost functions are given by ci(µt, σt) where ci : U×S→ <
is twice continuously differentiable, i ∈ N . ci and ciµ (derivative with respect to mean) are bounded,
and both ciµ and ciµµ (second derivative with respect to mean) are strictly positive. The total costs
incurred by agent i ∈ N is given by ∫ 1
0
ci(µt, σt)dt. In this setting there is an interaction effect
on the two moments of the outcome process and on the costs of agents. Yet, it also handles the
standard environment with two agents in which one agent determines only the mean and the other
agent only the variance, and the interaction effect on the costs is assumed to be minimal.
6We assume σ satisfies a uniform Lipschitz condition: There exists a constant K such that for Z, Z¯ ∈ C[0, 1],
|σ(t, Z) − σ(t, Z¯)| ≤ K sup0≤s≤t |Z(s) − Z¯(s)|. Even though this condition may be weakened (as was suggested
by an anonymous referee) by noticing that our process is one dimensional and by employing Revuz and Yor (1999,
Theorem 3.5, p.390; Exercises 3.13-14, p.397) (while it would still hold for the optimal contract), we use this Lipschitz
condition (so, Revuz and Yor (1999, Theorem 2.1, p.375)) in order to have a parallel presentation with Sung (1995).
7This formulation is consistent with our hypothesis of the mean and variance being unobservable and nonverifiable
by the principal. If (Si)i∈N were to depend on the entire process {Xt}t, implying that {Xt}t is observable and
verifiable by the principal, then she could infer {µt}t and/or {σt}t. For more, see footnotes 7 and 8 of Sung (1995).
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All have CARA utilities where the coefficients of the principal and agent i ∈ N are given by R
and ri, respectively. The reservation certainty equivalent agent i ∈ N is given by Wi0. We assume
that at each t ∈ [0, 1], agents observe ht ≡ {Xs, µs, σs, (eis)i∈N}s≤t. Agent i’s expected utility at time
t given ((Si)i, µ, σ) (computed with the information at time t) is E
[− exp{−riW Si (X;µ, σ)}∣∣Ft]
where W Si (X;µ, σ) =
(
Si(X)−
∫ 1
0
ci(µs, σs)ds
)
is his net payoff at the end of the project.
At any t, ht is observable and verifiable by all the agents but not the principal, and (Si)i∈N
is determined by the principal at the beginning of the project. Any communication between the
principal and the agents is not allowed as in Che and Yoo (2001).8 Thus, at any instant a utilitarian
bargaining problem among the agents emerges due to collusion opportunities. Its outcome can be
implemented via state–contingent binding contracts drafted and agreed upon in date 0, specifying
an allocation among the agents for each possible date and state. As for any given history agents’
arrangement ensures optimality from that state onwards, our formulation involves renegotiation.
Collusion implies that the outcome of agents’ bargaining is ex–ante efficient; so there is no history,
state, and any other feasible contract that every agent (strictly) prefers to the one that was agreed
upon. This brings about optimal risk sharing. Given Ft–predictable salaries Si : [0, 1] × Ω → <,
i ∈ N , agent i’s induced salary at time t under S ≡ (Si)i∈N is Si(t) : Ω → <, denoting the salary
arrangement (on compensations to be made at the end of the project) to i under S at t. Below we
define the agents’ problem where the first requirement is a natural feasibility constraint, the second
a balanced budget condition, and the third agent i’s date–t participation constraint.9
Definition 1 (The Agents’ Problem) Given the principal’s offer, salaries Si : Ω→ < for i ∈ N
and Ft–predictable control laws µ : [0, 1] × Ω → U and σ : [0, 1] × Ω → S and bargaining weights
θ : [0, 1]×Ω→ int(∆) (where int(∆) denotes the interior of the N dimensional simplex), the side–
contracting via control laws S˜i : [0, 1]×Ω→ < for i ∈ N , µ˜ : [0, 1]×Ω→ U and σ˜ : [0, 1]×Ω→ S
solves the agents’ problem at θ if for a.e. t and ht
∑
i∈N
θitE
[
− exp
{
−riW Sˆ(t)i (X; µˆ, σˆ)
}∣∣∣Ft] (1)
8Otherwise by offering additional payoffs the principal can make the agents report others’ choices and implement
the first-best, at least in a one-shot setting. While the value of this communication is not trivial due to agents’ abilities
to punish “snitches” in a repeated setting, not allowing any communication between the principal and the agents
helps us to abstract from these complications. For more see footnote 13 of Barlo and O¨zdog˘an (2013). Moreover,
footnote 2 of the current paper provides examples when this abstraction is plausible.
9The date–t participation constraint considers the grand coalition/team, and not sub–coalitions. This can be
justified when one assumes that each player has a right to veto the outcome of the agents’ bargaining.
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is maximized where W
Sˆ(t)
i (X; µˆ, σˆ) ≡
(
Sˆi(t)(X)−
∫ 1
0
ci(µˆs, σˆs)ds
)
, X ∈ Ω, and
dXτ = µˆτdτ + σˆτdBτ , τ ≥ t, (2)
N∑
i=1
Sˆi(t)(X) ≤
N∑
i=1
Si(X), X ∈ Ω, (3)
E
[
− exp
{
−riW Sˆ(t)i (X; µˆ, σˆ)
}∣∣∣Ft] ≥ E [− exp{−riW Si (X;µ, σ)}∣∣Ft] , i ∈ N. (4)
The principal is aware of the collusion capabilities and bargaining among agents. Hence, she
knows that while she is restricted to offer contracts that solve the agents’ problem starting any date
and state for some bargaining weights, she is not aware of agents’ “real” bargaining weights.
Definition 2 (The Principal’s Problem) Principal chooses salary functions Sˆi : Ω → < for
i ∈ N and control laws µˆ : [0, 1]× Ω→ U and σˆ : [0, 1]× Ω→ S such that
(
(Sˆi)i∈N , µˆ, σˆ
)
∈ argmax((Si)i∈N ,µ,σ)E
[
− exp
{
−R
(
X1 −
N∑
i=1
Si(X)
)}∣∣∣∣∣F0
]
subject to
i. Feasibility: dXt = µtdt+ σtdBt, t ∈ [0, 1];
ii. Individual Rationality: E
[− exp{−riW Si (X;µ, σ)}∣∣F0] ≥ − exp{−riWi0}, i ∈ N ;
iii. The Agents’ Problem: (Si)i∈N and (µ, σ) must be such that there exists a profile of control laws
Si : [0, 1]×Ω→ < satisfying Si(1)(X) = Si(X), i ∈ N and X ∈ Ω, so that ((Si)i, µ, σ) solves
the agents’ problem at some bargaining weights θ : [0, 1]× Ω→ int(∆) given ((Si)i, µ, σ).
In Definition 2, feasibility and individual rationality are standard. Collusion, on the other hand,
is handled by requiring that the principal’s offer solves the agents’ problem.
3 Optimality of Linearity
Our main theorem proves that the linearity results of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), Scha¨ttler
and Sung (1993), and Sung (1995) are robust with respect to collusion and renegotiation.
Theorem 1 There exists a stationary and linear optimal collusion proof and renegotiation proof
contract.
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The rest of the paper concerns the proof of this result which involves 3 steps. First, we analyze
the efficiency implications of the agents’ problem and obtain some desirable properties. In fact,
we show that the interaction among agents is similar to that in Bone (1998) and its aggregation
result holds in our setting. This enables us to associate the agents’ problem with one that involves
a “representative agent” (the team of all agents) having a CARA utility.10 11 In the second step
we consider the associated version of the principal’s problem with a team and establish optimality
of linearity as in Sung (1995). The final step shows that this result is preserved in the principal’s
problem containing the agents’ when the team’s payments are distributed efficiently.
Definition 3 Given t and ht and (µτ , στ )τ∈[0,1], (Si(t))i∈N is static efficient at ht if there exists
θt ∈ int(∆) such that
(Si(t))i∈N ∈ argmax
Sˆ(t)
∑
i∈N
θitE
[
− exp
{
−riW Sˆ(t)i (X;µ, σ)
}∣∣∣Ft]
subject to (1) dXτ = µτdτ + στdBτ for τ ≥ t, and (2)
∑N
i=1 Sˆi(t)(X) ≤
∑N
i=1 Si(t)(X) for X ∈ Ω.
Lemma 1 Given t and ht and (µτ , στ )τ∈[0,1], (Si(t))i∈N is static efficient at h
t if and only if there
is (θit)i∈N ∈ int(∆) such that for a.e. X ∈ Ω and for any i, j ∈ N
θitri exp
{
−riW S(t)i (X;µ, σ)
}
= θjtrj exp
{
−rjW S(t)j (X;µ, σ)
}
. (5)
Proof. Let t and ht and (µτ , στ )τ∈[0,1] be given. We denote the resulting probability density
function on X by f(·;µ, σ | Ft).12 Due to the strict concavity of the utility functions, the necessary
conditions of the first-order analysis are also sufficient. Hence, (Si(t))i∈N is static efficient at h
t if
10In that study a group of agents with CARA utilities jointly choose between uncertain prospects. A static
environment is modeled, while the following two key aspects are common with our setting: (1) the choice of any
prospect must be unanimously agreed, and (2) the uncertain outcomes from the chosen prospect are distributed
among agents according to some unanimously made prior agreements.
11An earlier study, Brennan and Kraus (1978), shows that an aggregation leading to a representative agent repre-
sentation is possible when agents have either CARA utilities or HARA (hyperbolic absolute risk aversion) preferences
with equal exponents. And, it is shown in section 4 in Bone (1998) that this conclusion does not hold with noniden-
tical exponents. Moreover, the representative agent’s utility function is not necessarily negative exponential with
HARA utilities having identical exponents. However, as the stationary decision making environment is a key feature
in the search for optimality of linearity, the CARA utilities’ property of not involving any income effects and the
use of stochastic processes with the martingale property are essential: The history in our setting determines the
accumulated returns which do not influence agents’ decisions due to lack of income effects; and, incremental future
returns is expected not to be different from today’s due to the martingale property.
12It is useful to remind the reader that for any standard Brownian motion X = {Xt : t ∈ [0,∞)}, Xt has a
probability density function ft given by ft(x) = 1/(
√
2pit) exp{−x2/(2t)}.
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and only if for every i ∈ N
θitri exp
{
−riW S(t)i (X;µ, σ)
}
f(X;µ, σ | Ft) = λX , for a.e. X ∈ Ω (6)
where λX denotes the Lagrangian multiplier of the feasibility for the redistribution in state X and
it has to be strictly positive as the constraint binds due to the objective function being strictly
increasing. Note that f(X;µ, σ | Ft) > 0, X ∈ Ω, and 6 is analogous to condition 4 of Bone (1998).
Since the right-hand side of 6 does not depend on the identity of the agent, the result follows.
By following the same arithmetic manipulations of Bone (1998) (conditions 9–13), we obtain:
Lemma 2 Given t and ht and (µτ , στ )τ∈[0,1], (Si(t))i∈N is static efficient at h
t if and only if there
is (θit)i∈N ∈ int(∆) such that for all i ∈ N and a.e. X ∈ Ω,
W
S(t)
i (X;µ, σ) = kit +
rc
ri
W¯ S(t)(X;µ, σ) (7)
where rc =
(∑
j 1/rj
)−1
and kit = (rc/ri)
(∑
j (ln(θitri)− ln(θjtrj)) /rj
)
and W¯ S(t)(X;µ, σ) =∑
iW
S(t)
i (X;µ, σ).
Proof. The rearrangement of equation 5 in logarithmic form is as follows: for a.e X ∈ Ω and every
i, j ∈ N , there exist {θit, θjt} at time t such that,
W
S(t)
j (X;µ, σ) =
ri
rj
W
S(t)
i (X;µ, σ) +
ln(θjtrj)− ln(θitri)
rj
.
Summing across j while keeping i fixed results in
W¯ S(t)(X;µ, σ) =
∑
j
W
S(t)
j (X;µ, σ) =
∑
j
(
ri
rj
W
S(t)
i (X;µ, σ) +
ln(θjtrj)− ln(θitri)
rj
)
= riW
S(t)
i (X;µ, σ)
∑
j
1
rj
+
∑
j
ln(θjtrj)− ln(θitri)
rj
=
ri
rc
W
S(t)
i (X;µ, σ)−
ri
rc
kit
where rc and kit are as defined in the statement of the lemma. Hence, the result follows.
So given the history and control laws, static efficiency at that history implies that agent i’s
payment in instant t from the total payments (the team’s state–contingent compensation) involves
a (state–independent) constant payment, and a fraction which depends on agents’ CARA coefficients
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and not the bargaining weights. Moreover, summing across agents these fractions add up to unity
while the fixed payments sum to zero. This leads to the following:
Lemma 3 Suppose that for given t and ht and (µτ , στ )τ∈[0,1], (Si(t))i∈N is static efficient at h
t
and let θt ∈ int(∆), identifying (kit)i ∈ <N according to Lemma 2, be associated with (Si(t))i. Let
Q(t) : Ω → < be given and W¯Q(t)(X;µ, σ) ≡
(
Q(t)(X)−∑i (∫ 10 ci(µs, σs)ds)), X ∈ Ω. Then
(S˜i(t))i∈N , a feasible redistribution of Q(t) according to θt (thus, (kit)i) defined by
W
S˜(t)
i (X;µ, σ) = kit +
rc
ri
W¯Q(t)(X;µ, σ),
for a.e. X ∈ Ω, is also static efficient at ht.
Proof. Let t and ht and (µτ , στ )τ∈[0,1] be given, and (Si(t))i∈N along with θt and (kit)i be as in the
statement of the lemma. Hence, due to Lemmas 1 and 2 the profile (Si(t))i∈N is static efficient at
ht is equivalent to for a.e. X ∈ Ω
θitri exp
{
−ri
(
kit +
rc
ri
W¯ S(t)(X;µ, σ)
)}
= θjtrj exp
{
−rj
(
kjt +
rc
rj
W¯ S(t)(X;µ, σ)
)}
,
which simplifies to, θitri exp {−rikit} = θjtrj exp {−rjkjt}. To see that (S˜i(t))i∈N is static efficient
at ht we prove that this profile satisfies 5. This follows from the last equation and for a.e. X ∈ Ω
we have W¯ S˜(t)(X;µ, σ) = W¯Q(t)(X;µ, σ) and
θitri
θjtrj
=
exp {−rjkjt}
exp {−rikit} =
exp
{
−rj
(
kjt +
rc
rj
W¯ S˜(t)(X;µ, σ)
)}
exp
{
−ri
(
kit +
rc
ri
W¯ S˜(t)(X;µ, σ)
)} .
We employ this lemma to establish that the principal does need not to know what the “real”
bargaining weights θt are. As the bargaining weights do not affect agents’ shares from the total
compensation when dealing with static efficiency at a given history, it can be shown that in such
situations the interests of all the agents are perfectly aligned.
Lemma 4 Suppose that for given t and ht and (µτ , στ )τ∈[0,1], (Si(t))i∈N associated with θt and (kit)i
and (S′i(t))i∈N are both static efficient at h
t with the additional requirement that (S′i(t))i∈N is defined
by
W
S′(t)
i (X;µ
′, σ′) = kit +
rc
ri
W¯ S
′(t)(X;µ′, σ′).
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Then,
E
[
− exp
{
−rjW S(t)j (X;µ, σ)
}∣∣∣Ft] > E [− exp{−rjW S′(t)j (X;µ′, σ′)}∣∣∣Ft] , for some j ∈ N (8)
if and only if
E
[− exp{−rcW¯ S(t)(X;µ, σ)}∣∣Ft] > E [− exp{−rcW¯ S′(t)(X;µ′, σ′)}∣∣∣Ft] . (9)
Proof. Let t and ht and (µτ , στ )τ∈[0,1] be given and (Si(t))i∈N associated with θt and (kit)i and
(S′i(t))i∈N be as in the statement of the lemma. Notice that in light of Lemma 2 (equation 7),
inequality 8 holds for any one of j ∈ N if and only if
E
[
− exp
{
−rj
(
kjt +
rc
rj
W¯ S(t)(X;µ, σ)
)}∣∣∣∣Ft] > E [− exp{−rj (kjt + rcrj W¯ S′(t)(X;µ′, σ′)
)}∣∣∣∣Ft]
which equivalent to
exp {−rjkjt}E
[− exp{rcW¯ S(t)(X;µ, σ)}∣∣Ft] > exp {−rjkjt}E [− exp{rcW¯ S′(t)(X;µ′, σ′)}∣∣∣Ft] ,
delivering the desired conclusion as the last inequality is equivalent to 9.
Now, we proceed with associating these conclusions with dynamic notions of efficiency:
Definition 4 Given (µτ , στ )τ∈[0,1], (Si)i∈N with Si : [0, 1] × Ω → < for i ∈ N is efficient if for
a.e. t and ht it must be that (Si(t))i∈N is static efficient at h
t. We say that ((Si)i, µ, σ) is efficient
whenever (Si)i is efficient for given µ and σ.
Then, under the light of our findings about efficiency and the fact that agents’ interest are
perfectly aligned, we wish to define the team’s problem:
Definition 5 (The Team’s Problem) Given the principal’s offer, salaries Si : Ω→ < for i ∈ N
and Ft–predictable control laws µ : [0, 1] × Ω → U and σ : [0, 1] × Ω → S, S˜c : [0, 1] × Ω → < and
µ˜ : [0, 1]×Ω→ U and σ˜ : [0, 1]×Ω→ S solve the team’s problem if for a.e. t and ht the following
is maximized
E
[
− exp
{
−rcW Sˆc(t)c (X; µˆ, σˆ)
}∣∣∣Ft] , (10)
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where W
Sˆc(t)
c (X; µˆ, σˆ) ≡
(
Sˆc(t)(X)−
∑
i
(∫ 1
0
ci(µˆs, σˆs)ds
))
, X ∈ Ω, subject to
dXτ = µˆτdτ + σˆτdBτ , τ ≥ t, (11)
Sˆc(t)(X) ≤
∑
i
Si(X), X ∈ Ω. (12)
E
[
− exp
{
−rcW Sˆc(t)c (X; µˆ, σˆ)
}∣∣∣Ft] ≥ E [− exp{−riW Si (X; µˆ, σˆ)}∣∣Ft] , ∀i ∈ N. (13)
The date–t participation constraint, 13, can be interpreted as follows: the expected utility of
the representative agent (the team) cannot be strictly lower than the expected utility of any one of
the agents. Otherwise whether or not such an agent would be willing to participate into the team
arrangement is at jeopardy.
For any control laws (ST , µT , σT ) that solve the team’s problem, we prove that we can construct
a redistribution so that efficiency in every date and state is obtained and agents’ problem is solved.
Lemma 5 Let the principal’s offer, Si : Ω → <, i ∈ N , and Ft–predictable µ : [0, 1] × Ω → U
and σ : [0, 1] × Ω → S be given, and suppose that the Ft–predictable profile (STc , µT , σT ), with
STc : [0, 1] × Ω → < and µT : [0, 1] × Ω → U and σT : [0, 1] × Ω → S, solves the team’s problem.
Then ((STi )i, µ
T , σT ) obtained by distributing the team’s payments with θ∗ : [0, 1] × Ω → int(∆)
where θ∗it =
rc
ri
for all t and ht is efficient and solves the agents’ problem at θ∗ for given ((Si)i, µ, σ).
Proof. Let the principal’s offer ((Si)i, µ, σ) be as in the statement of the lemma and suppose
(STc , µ
T , σT ) solves the team’s problem. Define ST = (STi )i using θ
∗ as follows: for a.e. t, ht and X
W
ST (t)
i (X;µ
T , σT ) =
rc
ri
W¯ S
T (t)(X;µT , σT ), (14)
while W¯ S
T (t)(X;µT , σT ) =W
STc (t)
c (X;µT , σT ) for a.e. t and ht and X.
Next, we prove that ((STi )i, µ
T , σT ) is efficient: Let t and ht be given and θ∗i =
rc
ri
. Observe
that kTit = (rc/ri)(
∑
j(ln(θ
∗
i ri)− ln(θ∗j rj))/rj) = 0 for all i, t, ht. So 14, the defining condition of
(STi (t))i, satisfies 7; hence, (S
T
i (t))i is static efficient at h
t by Lemma 2.
(STc , µ
T , σT ) solving the team’s problem means that for a.e. t and ht it maximizes 10 subject
to 11 and 12 and 13. We wish to show that ((STi )i, µ
T , σT ) satisfies the constraints of the agents’
problem. As
∑
i
rc
ri
= 1, 11 and 12 imply 2 and 3. We display that 4 also holds: since (STi )i is
defined for a.e. t and ht and X by 14 it must be that riW
ST (t)
i (X;µ
T , σT ) = rcW¯
ST (t)(X;µT , σT )
and W¯ S
T (t)(X;µT , σT ) =W
STc (t)
c (X;µT , σT ) for a.e. t and ht and X; this implies 13 if and only if 4.
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In the next step we prove that for any ((SAi )i, µ
A, σA) that solve the agents’ problem for θ∗,
the associated profile (
∑
i S
A
i , µ
A, σA) satisfies 11 and 12 and 13 of the team’s problem. Notice
that ((SAi )i, µ
A, σA) is efficient: since the definition of static efficiency concerns the maximization
of 1 subject to 2 and 3 for a given t and ht and (µAτ , σ
A
τ )τ∈[0,1], we conclude that for a.e. t and h
t,
((SAi (t))i, µ
A, σA) is static efficient at ht. So Lemma 2 applies and using θ∗ we obtain:
W
SA(t)
i (X;µ
A, σA) = kAit +
rc
ri
W¯ S
A(t)(X;µA, σA), where kAit = 0 for all t and h
t and i. (15)
2 and 3 concerning ((SAi )i, µ
A, σA) imply 11 and 12 involving (
∑
i S
A
i , µ
A, σA). And 13 if and only if
4: since (SAi )i is defined for a.e. t and h
t and X by 15, riW
SA(t)
i (X;µ
A, σA) = rcW¯
SA(t)(X;µA, σA)
and W¯ S
A(t)(X;µA, σA) =W
S¯A(t)
c (X;µA, σA) where S¯A(t)(X) =
∑
i S
A
i (t)(X), i ∈ N .
The preceding two paragraphs establish that (1) the solution to the team’s problem satisfies
the constraints of the agents’ problem when the distribution is done according to θ∗, and (2) the
solution of the agents’ problem at θ∗ satisfies the constraints of the team’s problem.
Finally, we establish that if (STc , µ
T , σT ) solves the team’s problem, then ((STi )i, µ
T , σT ) solves
the agents’ problem at θ∗. From the above we know that ((STi )i, µ
T , σT ) is efficient. So using 14
and θ∗, the objective function of the agents’ problem (condition 1) becomes
∑
i
θ∗iE
[
− exp{−riW S
T (t)
i (X;µ, σ)}
∣∣∣Ft] =∑
i
rc
ri
E
[
− exp{−rcW¯ ST (t)(X;µ, σ)}
∣∣∣Ft]
= rc
(∑
i
1
ri
)
E
[
− exp{−rcW STc (t)c (X;µ, σ)}
∣∣∣Ft] = E [− exp{−rcW STc (t)c (X;µ, σ)}∣∣∣Ft] .
Therefore, the objective functions of the two problems coincide, delivering the desired conclusion.
Now, the principal may contract directly with the representative agent having a CARA coefficient
rc =
(∑
i
1
ri
)−1
and a reservation certainty equivalent Wc0 =
∑
iWi0 and costs cc : U × S → < is
defined by cc(µt, σt) =
∑
i ci(µt, σt):
Definition 6 Principal chooses a salary for the team Sˆc : Ω→ < and control laws µˆ : [0, 1]×Ω→ U
and σˆ : [0, 1]× Ω→ S, such that
(
Sˆc, µˆ, σˆ
)
∈ argmax(Sc,µ,σ)E [− exp {−R (X1 − Sc(X))}|F0]
subject to
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i. dXt = µtdt+ σtdBt, t ∈ [0, 1];
ii. E
[− exp{−rcW Scc (X;µ, σ)}∣∣F0] ≥ − exp{−rcWc0};
iii. Sc and (µ, σ) must be such that there exists Sc : [0, 1]× Ω→ < satisfying Sc(1)(X) = Sc(X),
X ∈ Ω, so that for a.e. t and ht, (Sc, µ, σ) maximizes E
[
− exp
{
−rcW S˜c(t)c (X; µ˜, σ˜)
}∣∣∣Ft]
subject to dXτ = µ˜τdτ + σ˜τdBτ , τ ≥ t, and S˜c(t)(X) ≤ Sc(X), X ∈ Ω.
The principal’s problem involving the representative agent given in Definition 6 belongs to the
class studied in Sung (1995) and his Proposition 2 applies which we restate using our notation.13
Lemma 6 (Proposition 2 of Sung (1995)) Let (m∗, s∗) be a control pair that solves the follow-
ing constrained static maximization problem. Choose (mˆ, sˆ) ∈ U × S to maximize
Φp(mˆ, sˆ) = mˆ+Rsˆ2ccµ(mˆ, sˆ)− cc(mˆ, sˆ)− 1
2
(R + rc) (ccµ(mˆ, sˆ))
2 sˆ2 − R
2
sˆ2
subject to (mˆ, sˆ) ∈ argmax(m,s)∈U×SΦa(m, s | mˆ, sˆ) := ccµ(mˆ, sˆ)m− cc(m, s)− rc2 (ccµ(mˆ, sˆ))2 s2.
Then (m∗, s∗) is the optimal control pair for all t ∈ [0, 1], and the principal’s optimal remaining
expected utility V over time is given by V (t,Xt) = − exp {−R (Xt −Wc0 + (1− t)Φp(m∗, s∗))}.
Furthermore, the optimal salary scheme S∗c is linear in the final realized outcome X1, and is
given by
S∗c (X1) =Wc0 + cc(m
∗, s∗) + ccµ(m∗, s∗) ((X1 −X0)−m∗) + rc
2
(ccµ(m
∗, s∗))2 s∗2. (16)
Proof. See the Appendix of Sung (1995).
We have to emphasize that “Φp is representative of the principal’s expected utility” while “Φa
can be viewed as a representative of the (representative) agent’s expected utility” (Sung 1995).
Therefore, Lemma 6 tells that the principal’s problem given in Definition 6 has a (stationary)
solution (S∗c , µ
∗, σ∗) where µ∗ : [0, 1] × Ω → U and σ∗ : [0, 1] × Ω → S are defined by µ∗t (X) = m∗
and σ∗t (X) = s
∗ for t ∈ [0, 1] and X ∈ Ω, and S∗c is linear in X1 as it is given by equation 16.
The principal distributing (S∗c , µ
∗, σ∗), efficiently using θ∗ attains S∗ = (S∗i )i defined by
W S
∗
i (X;µ
∗, σ∗) = (rc/ri)W S
∗
c
c (X;µ
∗, σ∗). (17)
13Sung (1995) uses the first–order approach, introduced by Scha¨ttler and Sung (1993), by allowing agents to control
the variance as well as the mean of the process. The first–order necessary conditions lead to a semi–martingale
representation of agent’s salary function which, in turn, is used to obtain a relaxed version of the principal’s problem.
13
Let S∗k : [0, 1]× Ω→ < for k = c, 1, . . . , N be given by S∗k(t)(X) = S∗k(X), t ∈ [0, 1] and X ∈ Ω.
Lemma 7 S∗i : Ω → < is linear in X1 for all i ∈ N . And (S∗c , µ∗, σ∗) solves the team’s problem
(Definition 5) given ((S∗i )i, µ
∗, σ∗); ((S∗i )i, µ
∗, σ∗) solves the agents’ problem (Definition 1) given
((S∗i )i, µ
∗, σ∗) at θ∗. Finally, ((S∗i )i, µ
∗, σ∗) solves the principal’s problem (Definition 2).
Proof. The linearity of S∗i follows from the fact that 17 is equivalent to S
∗
i (X) being equal to
S∗i (X) = ci(m
∗, s∗) +
rc
ri
(∑
j∈N
Wj0 + A1(X1 −X0) + A2
)
,
where A1 =
∑
j∈N cjµ(m
∗, s∗) and A2 = rc2 (
∑
j∈N cjµ(m
∗, s∗))2s∗2− (∑j∈N cjµ(m∗, s∗))m∗. As ciµ is
strictly positive, A1 is strictly positive.
To establish that (S∗c , µ
∗, σ∗) solves the team’s problem given ((S∗i )i, µ
∗, σ∗), it suffices to show
that 13 is satisfied. This holds because by definition E[− exp{−rcW S
∗
c(t)
c (X;µ∗, σ∗)}|Ft] equals
E[− exp{−rcW S
∗
c
c (X;µ∗, σ∗)}|Ft] = E[− exp{−riW S∗i (X;µ∗, σ∗)}|Ft], i ∈ N , due to 17.
Now, Lemma 5 applies, so ((S∗i )i, µ
∗, σ∗) solves the agents’ problem given ((S∗i )i, µ
∗, σ∗) at θ∗.
To show that ((S∗i )i, µ
∗, σ∗) solves the principal’s problem given in Definition 2 it suffices to
prove that this profile satisfies agents’ individual rationality constraints. This follows from the fact
that E[− exp{−ri(S∗i −
∫ 1
0
ci(µ
∗, σ∗)dt)}|F0] = E[− exp{−ri(Wi0+ rcri (A1(X1−X0)+A2))}|F0], and
this equals − exp{−riWi0}E[− exp{−rc(S∗c −Wc0 − cc(m∗, s∗))}|F0], and the individual rationality
constraint of the representative agent (condition ii in Definition 6) being satisfied.
This finishes the proof of Theorem 1.
4 Concluding Remarks
Now, we consider the situation when agents’ “real” bargaining weights are employed. Let θR :
[0, 1]×Ω→ int(∆) be the agents’ real bargaining weights that the principal is not aware of. Below
we prove that ((S∗i )i, µ
∗, σ∗) also solves the agents’ problem given ((S∗i )i, µ
∗, σ∗) at θR.
Suppose not, and consider ((SRi )i, µ
∗, σ∗) where SRi is defined by
W
SR(t)
i (X;µ
∗, σ∗) = kRit +
rc
ri
W S
∗
c(t)
c (X;µ
∗, σ∗), (18)
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while (kRit )i is associated with (θ
R
it)i. Due to Lemma 3 we know that ((S
R
i )i, µ
∗, σ∗) is efficient. If
((SRi )i, µ
∗, σ∗) were not to solve the agents’ problem given ((S∗i )i, µ
∗, σ∗) at θR, then the solution
((SAi )i, µ
A, σA) must be efficient, thus satisfy 7 with (kRit )i (i.e. is given by W
SA(t)
i (X;µ
A, σA) =
kRit +
rc
ri
W
S∗c(t)
c (X;µA, σA), i ∈ N), and that there exists t and ht with
∑
i
θRitE
[
− exp
{
−riW S
A(t)
i (X,µ
A, σA)
}∣∣∣Ft] >∑
i
θRitE
[
− exp
{
−riW S
R(t)
i (X,µ
∗, σ∗)
}∣∣∣Ft] ,
which implies that there is some j ∈ N such that E[− exp{−rjW S
A(t)
j (X,µ
A, σA)}|Ft] strictly
exceeds E[− exp{−rjW S
R(t)
j (X,µ
∗, σ∗)}|Ft]. Since both ((SAi )i, µA, σA) and ((SRi )i, µ∗, σ∗) are ef-
ficient and defined via the same (kRit )i, Lemma 4 applies and the last inequality is equivalent
to E[− exp{−rcW S
∗
c(t)
c (X,µA, σA)}|Ft] being strict greater than E[− exp{−rcW S
∗
c(t)
c (X,µ∗, σ∗)}|Ft]
and this delivers a contradiction to µ∗ and σ∗ being optimal controls of Lemma 6.
Having established that ((SRi )i, µ
∗, σ∗) solves the agents’s problem for given ((S∗i )i, µ
∗, σ∗) at θR,
we obtain from 18 that riW
SR(t)
i (X;µ
∗, σ∗) = rikRit + rcW
S∗c(t)
c (X;µ∗, σ∗), and use the observation
that made in 14 to have rcW
S∗c(t)
c (X;µ∗, σ∗) = riW
S∗(t)
i (X;µ
∗, σ∗) delivering
kRit = W
SR(t)
i (X;µ
∗, σ∗)−W S∗(t)i (X;µ∗, σ∗).
Due to W
S∗(t)
i (X;µ
∗, σ∗) =W S
∗
i (X;µ
∗, σ∗), i’s date–t participation constraint 4, becomes
0 ≤ E
[
− exp
{
−riW S
R(t)
i (X;µ
∗, σ∗)
}∣∣∣Ft]+ E [exp{−riW S∗i (X;µ∗, σ∗)}∣∣Ft]
=
E
[
− exp
{
−riW S
R(t)
i (X;µ
∗, σ∗)
}∣∣∣Ft]
E [exp {−riW S∗i (X;µ∗, σ∗)}|Ft]
+
E
[
exp
{−riW S∗i (X;µ∗, σ∗)}∣∣Ft]
E [exp {−riW S∗i (X;µ∗, σ∗)}|Ft]
= E
[
− exp
{
−ri
(
W
SR(t)
i (X;µ
∗, σ∗)−W S∗i (X;µ∗, σ∗)
)}∣∣∣Ft]+ 1 = − exp{−rikRit}+ 1,
which implies exp
{
rik
R
it
} ≥ 1, so kRit ≥ 0, for all i ∈ N . Moreover, by efficiency ∑i kRit = 0. Hence,
kRit = 0 for all i and t and h
t, thus, ((SRi )i, µ
∗, σ∗) = ((S∗i )i, µ
∗, σ∗); a contradiction.
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